Representation through the eyes of the voter : a cost-benefit analysis of European integration by Borz, Gabriela
Borz, Gabriela (2016) Representation through the eyes of the voter : a 
cost-benefit analysis of European integration. Italian Political Science 
Review, 46 (02). pp. 175-197. ISSN 2057-4908 , 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/ipo.2016.8
This version is available at https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/56268/
Strathprints is  designed  to  allow  users  to  access  the  research  output  of  the  University  of 
Strathclyde. Unless otherwise explicitly stated on the manuscript, Copyright © and Moral Rights 
for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. 
Please check the manuscript for details of any other licences that may have been applied. You 
may  not  engage  in  further  distribution  of  the  material  for  any  profitmaking  activities  or  any 
commercial gain. You may freely distribute both the url (https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/) and the 
content of this paper for research or private study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without 
prior permission or charge. 
Any correspondence concerning this service should be sent to the Strathprints administrator: 
strathprints@strath.ac.uk
The Strathprints institutional repository (https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk) is a digital archive of University of Strathclyde research 
outputs. It has been developed to disseminate open access research outputs, expose data about those outputs, and enable the 
management and persistent access to Strathclyde's intellectual output.
1 
 
 
REPRESENTATION THROUGH THE EYES OF THE VOTER: A COST-BENEFIT 
ANALYSIS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 
 
 
 
Dr Gabriela Borz 
University of Strathclyde 
United Kingdom 
gabriela.borz@strath.ac.uk 
 
 
 
Abstract   
 
This article explains variation in the quality of representation in the context of European 
Parliament elections. Specifically, it clarifies how voters relate to political parties on the issue 
of European integration and whether they are represented, misrepresented or indifferent to 
this issue. The analysis shows that perceived benefits of European integration do drive a 
perfect voter-party match while perceived costs, when high, drive a perfect match between 
Eurosceptic voters and likeminded parties and make voters less indifferent. The analysis 
draws attention to the high number of status-quo voters who, in the absence of a party with 
similar views, could channel their vote towards a party promoting integration, but only if 
their knowledge about the EU and its benefits increases.  
 
 
Key words: substantive representation, European integration, European Parliament elections 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This article discusses the representation of individual voters on the issue of European 
integration. Why do some people vote for a party that represents their views while others 
chose to vote for a party that does not? Furthermore, can individual benefits received from 
the EU explain the difference between perfect and imperfect substantive representation on 
this issue? 
 
Of interest to this paper is the common benchmark to most forms of representation, which is 
the criterion of constituent-UHSUHVHQWDWLYH FRQJUXHQFH 7KH VLPLODULW\ EHWZHHQ YRWHUV¶
SUHIHUHQFHV DQG UHSUHVHQWDWLYHV¶ IXWXUH actions is evident first and foremost in promissory 
representation, when electoral promises reflect the congruence between constituent and 
representative, but the norm of congruence applies to all forms of representation (Mansbridge 
2003). Recent debates on representation focus on various forms of representing the citizenry 
(promissory, anticipatory, surrogate, gyroscopic representation), forms which are not 
completely distinct, but which may become interchangeable over time (Mansbridge 2003). A 
similar idea appears in other normative outlooks of representation (Saward 2014: 726) 
whereby the shape-VKLIWLQJUHSUHVHQWDWLYHVGHSOR\µVKLIWLQJVKDGHVDQGDVSHFWVRIDUDQJHRI
UHSUHVHQWDWLYH UROHV >«@PRYLQJ LQ DQGDPRQJ D UDQJHRI IDPLOLDU UROHV¶ IURP WUXVWHH Dnd 
delegate to politico or informal representative in the form of advocates.  
 
The analysis provided in this paper offers an empirical account of the level of congruence as 
it occurs at the time of voting, without considering any post-election action from the 
representatives. The framework provides individual explanations for why different levels of 
congruence exist. Especially in the context of European Parliament elections which use 
proportional representation, the party is considered to be representative RI WKH YRWHU¶V
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preferences as in the responsible party government model (Budge et al 2012, Dalton et al 
2011).  
 
This article complements previous research on issue representation (Dalton 2015, Thomassen 
and Schmitt 1999, Costello et al. 2012) by adopting a different perspective centred on the 
voters. Whilst in most frameworks of representation the focus is on the actions and 
preferences of the representative, this paper places the emphasis on the input element of 
representation - the voter, who is ultimately the generator of the representational process. 
Before taking a decision about their preferred party, voters evaluate how well parties mirror 
their opinions. Voters do not think in aggregate terms and this justifies even more an 
individual approach to representation.  
 
The contribution of this article is twofold. Firstly, in order to explain the quality of 
substantive representation, the research tests explanations at the level of the principals 
(voters) and of the agent (parties) across EU member states. The analysis emphasizes the role 
of benefits and costs from integration - both individual and systemic. Secondly, by making 
XVHRIGLIIHUHQWGDWDVHWVRQSDUWLHVDQGYRWHUVWKHDQDO\VLVFDQPRUHDFFXUDWHO\PDWFKYRWHUV¶
opinions on EU integration (EES 2009) with the policy position of the exact parties they have 
voted for (Profiler 2009). As at the time this article was written the elite data was not yet 
publicly available for the 2014 elections, the matching of preferences was completed using 
the European Election Study and EU Profiler 2009 data across 27 EU countries. The first 
section sets out the conceptual framework, while the subsequent parts test several hypotheses 
advanced using a cost benefit model. The last sections present the results and discuss the 
implications for further research.  
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2. IMPERFECT REPRESENTATION: CONCEPTS AND THEORY 
 
Substantive representation is an important part in the process of delegation and 
accountability, a process with voters as principals and their agents who can be either 
members of parliament (MPs), political parties or governments and their policies. Theories of 
substantive representation postulate that governments and legislatures are supposed to mirror 
the preferences of their citizens (Dahl 1956, Pitkin 1967). Conversely, citizens are expected 
to vote for parties whose policy positions best represent their preferences. However, 
representation is never perfect, and what we find in practice is a match or mismatch between 
SDUWLHV DQG YRWHU¶V SUHIHUHQFHV ,W LV WKH DLP RI this article to test various explanations for 
different degrees of representation across Europe.  
 
This degree of match/mismatch matters for the quality of national governance and 
representative democracy. Explaining the quality of representation on EU integration is 
relevant because of a high mismatch between the opinions of voters and the opinions of 
MEPs (Van Der Eijk and Franklin 1991, 2004; Mattila and Raunio 2006).  Additionally, EU 
integration as a political issue is currently relevant for the future of the EU. The voter-party 
policy congruence is far weaker on EU integration issues than on the Left-Right dimension 
(Mattila and Raunio 2006, Schmitt and Thomassen 1999) this allows an analysis which can 
disentangle various individual explanations.  
The aim is to explain substantive individual representation, that is, the level of policy 
congruence between the voter and the actual party for which each voter has cast a ballot. This 
policy based relationship (Huber and Powell 1994, Powell 2000, Powell and Vanberg 2000, 
Blais and Bodet 2006, Budge and McDonald 2007, Golder and Stramsky 2010) between 
voters and parties is important as it is claimed to be the essence of democratic representation 
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(Katz 1980). The smaller the distance between the representatives and the ideological 
position of voters, the higher the congruence and hence the higher the level of substantive 
representation. Previous scholarship has focused mostly on the impact of institutions such as 
the electoral system or on the difference between consensus and majoritarian systems when 
explaining representation (Powell 2009). Systems using proportional representation and 
consensus institutions are usually associated with a higher level of congruence at the level of 
parliamentary parties (Golder and Loyd 2012; Golder and Stramski 2000). The electoral 
institutions are nevertheless less relevant in the context of European Parliament elections as 
most countries use proportional representation for these electoral contests. 
In contrast to previous institutionally based arguments, this article provides a cost-benefit 
framework which explains why individuals differ in their representation within and across 
countries of the EU. A cost-benefit approach to representation fits the policy chosen for 
investigation - European integration - as this issue is relevant considering the financial crisis 
followed by the current immigration crisis that the EU is facing. After the 2004 and 2007 EU 
enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe, European integration has started to receive 
higher importance from both parties and voters. Equally, as enlargement and integration 
progressed, immigration has become a significant dimension of party competition in 
European Parliament elections (Borz and Rose 2010, Barbulescu 2009).  An additional reason 
for choosing this issue is the large elite-mass gap (Mattila and Raunio 2006). At the time of 
the 2009 elections, the difference between citizens and MEPs favouring integration was 44 
percent. Only 40 percent of survey respondents declared themselves supportive of further 
integration, while an overwhelming majority of 84 percent parliamentarians in Brussels want 
further unification. While very few politicians (15 percent) think that integration has gone too 
far, twice as many citizens share that view. The middle ground status-quo supporters are large 
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in numbers amongst EU citizens (30 percent), yet almost nonexistent amongst MEPs (EES 
2009 and Profiler.eu).1 
 
In order to maximize representation, issue voting on European integration is a function of 
voWHUV¶SHUFHSWLRQRIWKHHQWLUHSURFHVVRILQWHJUDWLRQ7KHEHQHILWV and costs received from 
the EU following membership can play a role when voters decide to cast a vote for a party 
with a similar or a dissimilar position. The argument of this paper is that on the issue of 
European integration, voters maximize their representation based on their perceived 
individual and systemic utility associated with EU membership, utility which is mediated by 
issue salience. As representation is never perfect, explaining its extent requires an analysis in 
a multilevel setting. The overall policy position match is a function of individual 
characteristics and systemic features. In what follows, both types of utilities will be discussed 
in relation to substantive representation.   
 
SYSTEMIC BENEFITS 
The gains or losses associated with EU membership may influence voters to choose a party 
which has a similar position on EU integration. These gains or benefits can be perceived from 
an individual or systemic perspective. With regards to the latter, we expect a divide between 
new and old EU member states. In the 12 new member2 states which joined the EU in 2004 
and 2007, where, by and large, we find higher financial transfers from the EU budget, voters 
are largely EU enthusiasts and more likely to support integration. Furthermore, the elite in 
these countries felt consistently closer to Europe since financial transfers from the richer 
countries came as the means to avoid opposition to integration from these countries 
                                                 
1
Based on EU Profiler data base (www.profiler.eu) of national programme commitments, 2009. For citizens, the 
data is based on the European Election Survey, 2009 (www.piredeu.eu). Further details on the coding are 
presented in the data section. 
2 2004 entrants: Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Hungary, Malta and 
Cyprus. 2007 entrants: Romania and Bulgaria.  
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(Carrubba 1997). Following from this, we expect a higher voter-party match on EU 
integration in the new member states. Conversely, older member states, where citizens have 
participated in several European Parliament elections, have been more exposed to the 
implications of the acquis communautaire and have increasingly become more Eurosceptic 
(Leconte 2010). Therefore we expect a higher level of mismatch between their position and 
their party position. We therefore posit the following two hypotheses: 
 
 H1a: EU financial benefits - The higher the financial benefits from the EU budget, the more 
likely the match between the positions of voters and parties on EU integration. 
 
H1b: Length of EU membership - The newer the EU membership, the more likely the match 
between voter and party preferences on EU integration.  
 
INDIVIDUAL BENEFITS  
Individual voters across all member states may notice long term improvements in their 
communities, sometimes due to an increased receipt in EU funding, other times simply by 
being able to enjoy the benefits of a free market or freedom of movement. More informed 
and educated voters who follow the news regularly may notice systemic improvements in the 
economic situation. Individual benefits cannot however be entirely classified as economic 
(McLaren, 2002). Benefits from EU integration may be associated with various geopolitical, 
VWUDWHJLFDQGVRFLDOFXOWXUDO LPSURYHPHQWV WRYRWHUV¶ OLYHV(8PHPEHUVKLSDQG LQWHJUDWLRQ
may be perceived as a good thing from a market perspective but also because integration 
overall can be interpreted as a return to the big European family in the case of new member 
VWDWHV3RVLWLYHUHWXUQVFDQDOVREHSLQQHGGRZQWRYRWHUV¶VDWLVIDFWLRQWKDWWKH(8LQVWLWXWLRQV
are taking decisions in favour of or in line with the position of their own country in Brussels. 
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This perceived benefit gives voters a sense of efficacy, whereby each voter considers that 
their vote and opinions count (Finkel 1985). The satisfaction acquired is mainly related to the 
external or system responsiveness dimension of efficacy. Furthermore, being represented by 
politicians who share the same opinion makes voters think they have contributed to the 
decision making process and that parties and MEPs care about their opinions. 
 
However, following the financial crisis, a large proportion of voters who consider EU 
integration a good thing, do not want further European integration (Rose and Borz 2015) and 
choose the status-quo, which may explain different levels of representation attained on this 
issue. Satisfaction with the European Union and with the way several policies are handled 
from Brussels may make voters choose a party with a similar position to their own on 
European integration.  
 
H2: The higher the individual perceived benefits, the higher the quality of representation by 
parties promoting integration.  
 
Issue Salience ± The Mediation Factor 
The impact of costs and benefits on representation can be better understood if we know 
whether integration is a significant issue for voters. It is important to ascertain whether a low 
quality representation is indeed related to the lack of interest in the European Parliament 
elections, the EU as a whole (as posited by second order theories-- Reif and Schmitt 1980; 
Hix and Marsh 2007; van der Brug, van der Eijk, and Franklin 2007) or in the process of 
European unification altogether (as posited by salience theories). The salience of EU 
integration and opinion congruence influences vote choice (de Vries et al. 2011; Hobolt et al 
2009). If integration is of high importance, voting for a party which shares similar opinions 
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on the EU may prove beneficial for voters. As a consequence, the quality of representation is 
expected to increase as salience intensifies. If voters feel European, they will consider 
important be to represented on the issue of European integration; therefore a match between 
YRWHUV¶RSLQLRQVDQGSDUWLHV¶RSLQLRQVLVH[SHFWHG 
 
One has to distinguish between issue salience for voters and for parties. A perfect match is 
expected when voter preference and party position match and when the EU is salient for both 
parties and voters. The importance attributed by voters to EU integration may be influenced 
by the cues received from political parties. At times, parties have strategic incentives to give 
less attention to European issues (Hix et al 2007; Steenbergen and Scott 2004; Franklin and 
Wlezein, 1997; Van der Eijk and Franklin, 2004), hence the issue may be dormant in certain 
party systems. The other option is a system with all parties sharing similar positions on 
integration, leaving voters with no political alternatives to match their preferences. The vast 
majority of parties in the new EU 12, which had to negotiate several reforms with the EU, 
are, with a few recent exceptions (in Hungary and Poland), mostly pro-integration (Borz and 
Rose 2010). In a multidimensional political space, where parties compete over several issues 
such as welfare, immigration, taxation, and morality policies, the salience attributed to EU 
integration by parties is expected to count for the quality of representation. Therefore, the 
hypothesis to be tested is: 
 
H3: EU salience - The higher the EU salience for voters and parties, the more likely the 
match between voter and party preferences on EU integration.  
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COSTS 
In a similar vein with the benefits, the costs of integration can be economic (income or job 
insecurity), cultural (fear/thereat from other cultures) or political (decline of state 
sovereignty, EU democratic deficit). The creation of a new level of governance, such as 
(XURSHDQ8QLRQKDVOHGWRµDPRUHFRPSOH[FURVV-cutting network of governance based upon 
WKHEUHDNGRZQEHWZHHQGRPHVWLFDQGIRUHLJQDIIDLUVRQPXWXDOLQWHUIHUHQFHLQHDFKRWKHU¶V
domestic affairs, and RQ LQFUHDVLQJ PXWXDO WUDQVSDUHQF\¶ (Wallace, 1999, 519). European 
integration means also that international actors get involved in national politics, constitutional 
independence diminishes, and sovereign equality and market competition are transformed. 
Especially in old member states, membership came with an increased level of immigration 
from the EU, which puts an additional strain on national states. It has been emphasized that 
anti-immigration attitudes are a key factor for understanding resistance to integration (de 
Vrees and Boomgaarden 2005, Azrout et al., 2011; McLaren 2007). Negative attitudes 
towards immigration are usually in the form of perceived threats from immigrants, either 
because of their religion or because they would abuse social benefits (McLaren, 2002). 
Related to the threat of immigration is the evident economic argument that the open 
liberalized market would make those with high income benefit and those with low income 
lose (Gabel 1998) as immigrants would first take over the low skilled jobs in the host 
country. What one has to consider is also the increased immigration from outside the EU 
which puts an additional strain on national governments. All these arguments can be brought 
forward as explanations for an increased mismatch between parties and voters on EU 
integration.  
 
Henceforth, if this cost of membership outweighs the benefits, it is to be expected that the 
level of representation will increase, mainly for those Eurosceptic voters who have the option 
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of being represented by a party with similar views. Consequently, the hypothesis to be tested 
in relation to costs is as follows:  
 
H4: Costs - The higher the perceived costs of integration for individuals, the higher the level 
of representation by anti-integration parties.  
 
3. DATA AND EMPIRICAL STRATEGY  
  
Empirically, this analysis provides a more accurate measure of individual substantive 
representation than previous studies. Existing scholarship KDV PRVWO\ DQDO\VHG YRWHUV¶
perceptions RIZKHUHSDUWLHVDUH LQ WKHSROLF\VSDFHDQGFRPSDUHG LW WRYRWHUV¶RZQ policy 
preferences as reported in surveys (van der Eijk and Franklin 2004; Brandenburg and Johns 
2014). Additionally, most empirical research has been conducted at the aggregate party 
V\VWHP OHYHO 0DWWLOD DQG 5DXQLR  %XW FUXFLDOO\ YRWHUV¶ SHUFHSWLRQV RI SDUWLHV¶
SRVLWLRQVPD\QRWFRUUHVSRQGZHOOZLWKSDUWLHV¶DFWXDOSRVLWLRQV%HOFKLRU,WLVWKHDLP
of this article to investigate in detail the degree of congruence between the actual positions of 
parties and their voters.  
 
Representation 
The dependent variable in this study measures the quality of representation across voters and 
across countries. Based on party/voter match of opinions, representation is measured and 
conceptualized in three categories. When we have a match -- in other words, individuals vote 
for the party which has the same policy position -- then we consider this as perfect 
representation. This perfect match can go in both directions: for or against integration. In 
FDVH RI D PLVPDWFK EHWZHHQ YRWHUV¶ DQG SDUWLHV SUHIHUHQFHV, we count this as 
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misrepresentation. In this category, we include representation of voters in favour of 
integration by parties opposing integration and representation of voters against integration by 
parties favouring integration. The middle category are the neutral status-quo voters on EU 
integration, who prefer the level of EU integration to stay as it is and who, mostly because 
they have no party to match their opinion, choose to vote for a party which is either for or 
against integration. In spatial terms, when one considers the measurement scale for EU 
integration, the voters in this middle category are closer to the party they vote for then those 
in the misrepresented category, as their level of mismatch is lower. We consider this category 
as indifferent representation.  
 
The data for this variable has been compiled from two different data sets.3RVLWLRQVRQ(8
LQWHJUDWLRQfor parties were derived from the EU Profiler data (www.euprofiler.eu; Trechsel 
and Mair, 2009) and  for voters from the European Election Study 2009 (www.piredeu.eu). 
The EU Profiler study covers data on 156 parties with seats in the European Parliament after 
the 2009 elections. Their data on party positions was gathered following a triangulation 
process: from party manifestos, party experts and also from parties who were asked to 
position themselves on 28 issue dimensions. The issue of EU integration was derived by 
conducting factor analysis on the EU profiler data (Borz and Rose 2010: 8). The factor 
includes questions related to: EU integration being a good thing, being better off as a EU 
member state, the need to strengthen the  European Parliament, the EU foreign policy and the 
relationship with Russia, the EU security and defence policy, the necessity of national 
referendums on EU issues and the reduction of national vetoes in EU decision making. The 
original profiler coding scored parties¶ position on a 5 point scale from -2 (completely 
disagree) to +2 (completely agree).  For this analysis, the EU integration dimension was 
subsequently re-coded on a scale from -1 to +1 to reflect anti-integration, neutral and pro-
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integration opinions. In the case of voters, the EES 2009 study covers 27,069 voters across 27 
countries and has a clear cut question about European Integration: Some say European 
integration should be pushed further. Others say it has already gone too far. What is your 
opinion? Repondents were asked to place themselves from a scale from 0 (unification has 
gone too far) to 10 (unification should be pushed further), which was subsequently recoded 
into three categories as in the case of parties, to reflect voters pro, neutral and gainst 
integration. Respondents placing themselves at points 6 to 10 are classified as for more 
integration; at 0 to 4, in favour of less; and at point 5 or no opinion, as neutral. Only the 
actual voters from this study were identified together with the SDUW\WKH\YRWHGIRU3DUWLHV¶
position on EU integration was subsequently coordinated with the position of their voters in 
order to arrive at our variable with three categories of representation.  
 
Independent variables: context  
The financial benefits are calculated in Euro/cap following the budget data released by the 
(XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQRQWKHEDVLVRIHDFKFRXQWU\¶VUHYHQXHVDQGH[SHQGLWXUHVDVRI
The net balance per capita in Euros has a minimum deficit value of ± 211 Euros per capita in 
DenmarNDQGDPD[LPXPYDOXHRI(XURVSHUFDSLWDLQ/X[HPERXUJ)URPWKDW\HDU¶V
budget figures, 16 countries are net beneficiaries, while 11 countries are net contributors to 
the budget.  
 
Party competition on EU integration is coded as a dummy variable by taking into account the 
position of political parties on this issue. The variable shows whether parties within a country 
disagree or not on the issue of European integration (Borz and Rose 2010). An additional 
indicator employed for this purpose is the number of dimensions across which party 
competition is taking place in a system, meaning the number of issues on which parties 
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disagree during the electoral campaign. The data comes from the Profiler database following 
a detailed analysis of the positions taken by 156 political parties winning seats in the 
European Parliament election of 2009. Positions on 23 issues differentiate parties on five 
underlying dimensions: European integration; socioǦeconomic welfare; morality; the 
environment; and immigration. The intensity of party competition is reported by the number 
of dimensions on which parties have differing positions in each country and can take values 
from zero to five (for details, see Borz and Rose 2010).  
 
Length of membership is coded through a dummy variable which separates the new EU 12 
member states from the older member states.  
 
Independent variables: individuals  
The individual benefits are measured through the satisfaction acquired from how the EU 
handles its affairs. The indicators show the individual evaluation of the EU, hence the EU 
satisfaction scale includes the number of positive responses to the EES 2009 questions on 
whether EU is trusted and whether EU membership represents a good thing. The EES 2009 
survey question on whether individuals think that EU membership is a good thing asks 
individuals to evaluate EU integration in general and can be considered a measure which taps 
into both economic and non-economic benefits. Additional questions about the EU impact 
asked voters to assess EU policy influence on various policy domains such as economic 
conditions, health-care and interest rates. 
 
The economic, political and cultural individual costs of EU integration are measured through 
perceptions of the quality of the (8¶VGHFLVLRQ-making in general (whether it makes decisions 
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in the LQWHUHVW RI UHVSRQGHQW¶V FRXQWU\ DQG RI WKH (uropean Parliament in particular. The 
FRVWVDUHIXUWKHUPHDVXUHGE\YRWHUV¶RSLQLRQVDERXWLPPLJUDWLRQ 
 
The EU salience for individual voters was measured through a battery of questions from the 
EES which assess the importance attributed to the EU through information about the identity 
of voters and whether they feel European, whether they consider which party wins the 
European Parliament elections important, and whether they consider the EU responsible for 
dealing with most important problems facing their countries (see appendix for details).  
 
The analysis also includes a number of control variables which have been identified in the 
extant literature such as: information (knowledge about the EU), frequency with which voters 
follow news and specifically news about European Parliament elections; satisfaction with the 
government; party identification; left right position; and a few socio-economic variables such 
as education and standard of living.  
 
The empirical analysis of this paper proceeds in three stages. First, an overview of the quality 
of representation is presented across all EU member states. Second, the analysis focuses on 
the direct effect of individual and contextual benefits and costs of integration on the quality 
of representation. Both country and individual characteristics are included in a multinomial 
model that considers both individual and country level variables (Table 1). The hypotheses 
are tested by estimating a multinomial model which is justified by the three distinct 
categories of the dependent variable (Gelman and Hill 2007; Rabe-Hescketh and Skrondal 
2012). In the third stage, the pro and anti-integration voters are divided into two samples and 
the same analysis is repeated, in order to better disentangle the direction and effect of 
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integration benefits and costs on representation (Table 3). The descriptive statistics for all 
independent variables are provided in the Appendix Table 1.  
 
4. IMPERFECT REPRESENTATION ACROSS COUNTRIES  
 
The opinions of principals (voters) and agents (MEPs) on EU integration vary greatly across 
countries (see Figure 1). On average, 49 percent of voters are represented on this issue, 
followed by 30 percent who are completely misrepresented and 21 percent who are 
LQGLIIHUHQW %DVHG RQ RXU WKUHH FDWHJRULHV WKH HPSLULFDO GLVWULEXWLRQ RI WKLV µLPSHUIHFW¶
representation across Europe is detailed in the Appendix (Table 1) for each country.  
 
 
[Figure 1. Quality of representation across European countries about here] 
 
Amongst the EU27 member states, it is Romania that has the highest percentage of 
represented voters (72 percent). At the opposite end, we find Latvia with the lowest number 
of represented voters (24 percent). Overall, only 13 EU countries have a percentage of 
represented voters above the European average of 49 per cent. Conversely, 11 EU countries 
have their voters misrepresented above the total European average of 30 percent 
misrepresentation. What is also obvious from Figure 1, is a clear three way separation 
between the represented, misrepresented and indifferent groups which can be observed across 
all countries (Figure 1). The indifferent group is not marginal and takes values between a 
minimum of 12 percent of voters in Romania and a maximum of 32 percent in Ireland. With 
the exception of Bulgaria, the majority of indifferent representation, above the EU average, is 
found mainly in West European countries. For example, United Kingdom has the highest 
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proportion of neutral voters represented by a pro-integration party while Finland has one of 
the largest percentage of neutral voters represented by an anti-integration party. This clear 
differentiation between the three groups suggests that a dichotomy in terms of being 
represented or misrepresented, at least on the issue of European integration, is no longer 
appropriate. 
 
The percentage of voters represented by anti-integration parties could have been higher 
should the option of anti-integration parties have been readily available across all EU 
member states. One impediment against that happening was that parties with an anti-
integration stance could be identified only in 16 EU member states3 at the time of the 2009 
elections. Their number however increased after the 2014 European Parliament elections, and 
so did the number of their voters. Similarly, the absence of status-quo parties across EU 
member states explains the large percentage of voters in the indifferent category of 
representation.  In 2009, there were only three parties with representation in the European 
parliament which declared themselves neutral in terms of EU integration, whilst the percent 
of voters who prefer things to stay as they were was much larger.  
  
                                                 
3 At the time of 2009 EP elections, parties with an anti-integration stance could be identified in the following 
countries: Austria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Sweden and United Kingdom.  
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5. THE IMPACT OF COSTS AND BENEFITS ON THE QUALITY OF 
REPRESENTATION 
 
The results show support for the claim that perceived benefits playing a role in voters¶ 
decision, whether or not to vote for a party which has the same stance on EU integration. The 
perceived costs also are not negligible, especially for those voters who think of immigration 
as being a relevant threat.   
 
The analysis reported in Table 1 presents the results of a multinomial logit model which 
considers the dependent variable with three distinct categories of representation: 
µrepresented¶ µLQGLIIHUHQW¶ and µmisrepresented¶ YRWHUV. The analysis treats the represented 
group as the reference category. The novelty of these data allows for a clear differentiation 
between the three categories of representation and permits testing the strength of various 
explanations for belonging to each distinct category. The odds ratios (as reported in Table 1) 
which take values above 1 show a positive impact. Values below 1 show a negative impact of 
each independent variable on the probability of falling in each representation group.  
 
[Table 1. Explaining imperfect representation through costs and benefits about here] 
 
Financial benefits  
Financial benefits per capita calculated from the EU budget per each country do not have the 
expected directional influence. Contrary to our expectations, the more financial benefits a 
country receives from the EU, the more the voters from these countries are likely to be 
misrepresented. Additionally, with every unit increase in benefits from the EU, the odds of 
falling in the indifferent category are 37 percent higher than the odds of falling in the 
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represented category (odds ratio 1.37, Table 1). This negative relationship might be related to 
the lack of information voters have on this matter.  
 
Access to relevant information about the (8 LV LPSRUWDQW LQ VKDSLQJ SHRSOH¶V SUHIHUHQFHV
about European integration and in choosing their party accordingly. The influence of 
information on preferences also depends on the level of attention citizens are willing to give 
to it (Druckman and Lupia 2016). However, whether voters watch the election news on TV, 
or whether they follow news regularly, does not have an effect on the quality of issue 
representation on EU integration (Table 1). The effect clarifies when we differentiate 
between the pro and anti EU groups of voters (Table 3).  
 
Unfortunately, the EES 2009 survey does not provide us with a question which could control 
IRU YRWHUV¶ DZDUHQHVV RI WKHLU FRXQWU\¶V FRQWULEXWLRQ WR RU EHQHILW from the EU budget or 
DERXWDZDUHQHVVRIWKHLUFRXQWU\¶VDEVRUSWLRQRI(8IXQGV,QVWHDGRIWHVWLQJWKHDFWXDOYRWHU
knowledge about financial benefits, the analysis controls for information by using a proxy 
measure on the general knowledge about EU, and as reported, the above mentioned 
relationship between representation and financial benefits maintains. In fact, minimal 
knowledge about the EU is likely to make a voter more misrepresented than represented on 
EU integration.  
 
Table 2 presents a country distribution in terms of net balance per capita from/to the EU 
budget. Luxembourg is a clear outlier in this regard, with more than two thousand Euros per 
capita received from the EU budget in 2009. Against conventional expectations, new member 
states are not all included in the group of highest beneficiaries from the EU budget. Cyprus 
appears as a net contributor to the EU budget, while older member states such as 
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Luxembourg, Belgium, Spain, Portugal are net beneficiaries from the EU budget. An 
interaction factor between the twelve countries which have joined EU in 2004 and 2007 (New 
EU12) and the EU financial benefits not pass the significance threshold at 0.01 in the 
multinomial model4. This means that financial benefits are important across all EU countries 
and do not necessarily receive a higher importance when choosing a representative party in 
the new EU entrants. It is also worth mentioning that, in line with GaEHO¶VDUJXPHQWV
our results also show that with every unit increase in the perceived standard of living 
increases across Europe, the probability of voters being misrepresented and indifferent 
reduces by 9 and 8 percent respectively (odds ratios 0.91, 0.92, Table 1).  
 
[Table 2. Net beneficiaries and net contributors to the EU budget about here] 
 
2QH¶V FRXQWU\ RI UHVLGHQFH GRHV DFFRXQW IRU WKH GLIIHUHQFH EHWZHHQ UHSUHVHQWHG DQG
misrepresented. Voters in new member states are clearly more represented on the issue of EU 
integration than voters in older member states. They are not on average more satisfied with 
the EU and the majority of them think that the EU has had no positive influence on their 
counWU\¶V SROLFLHV 7KH\ GR QRW \HW consider as extremely high the costs attached to the 
political side of the integration process but they do react more strongly towards the threat 
posed by immigration.  
 
Voters from old member states are more likely to be indifferent and misrepresented than 
represented. Even when controlling for their level of satisfaction, the same holds true. Despite 
their approval of how the EU conducts its affairs, 23 percent of voters from Western 
countries are still more likely to prefer the status-quo in terms of European integration and 
                                                 
4 Not included in the analysis.  
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end up voting for a party which is either for or against integration. An additional 29 percent 
of the same voters are completely misrepresented by consenting to vote for a party with 
totally opposing views on EU integration. Overall, voters in old EU member states 
acknowledge in high numbers the political costs of integration, the increased levels of 
immigration and the EU influence on the latter. More than 11 percent of respondents in 2009 
declared that one of their parents was born outside their current country of residence. The 
majority of these citizens reside in old member states, which constitutes evidence of 
immigration flows across or from outside EU and their main direction towards Western 
Europe.  
 
The individual perception of costs and benefits  
 
Individual evaluation of benefits impacts the attainment of representation in the expected 
direction. $QLQGLYLGXDO¶VSRVLWLYHHYDOXDWLRQ and perception RI(8¶Vpolicy influence on his 
country leads him to cast a vote for a party which shares his opinion. As the results in Table 1 
show, the more individuals are satisfied with the way EU works, the lower the probability of 
falling in the misrepresented or indifferent category. For example, with one unit increase in 
the EU satisfaction of voters, the expected probability of being indifferent (rather than 
represented) decreases by 19 percent and the probability of being misrepresented falls even 
more, by 33 percent (Table 1, odds ratios 0.81, 0.67) . Similarly, the more voters think that an 
increased number of national policies are being influenced by EU decisions, the higher the 
quality of representation. Voters who trust the EU and think that EU membership is a good 
thing largely tend to be represented by pro integration parties (see Table 3, model 1).  
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Variance in individual EU salience is another explanation which differentiates between the 
misrepresented and the represented category of voters. They are less likely to be 
PLVUHSUHVHQWHGLI WKH(8LVDQLPSRUWDQW LVVXHIRURQH¶VYRWLQJGHFLVLRQThose voters who 
identify with Europe are 24 and 20 percent respectively less probable to fall in the category of 
misrepresented or indifferent than those voters who do not feel Europeans (Table 1, odds 
ratios 0.76 and 0.80). In line with the initial expectation, the higher the salience of the EU, the 
higher the probability of being represented on this issue. This finding is partly in line with 
previous research about issue voting and issue salience (de Vries et al. 2011). However, 
salience does not differentiate between the indifferent and misrepresented groups. Similar 
numbers, 26 percent and 21 percent respectively, out of those who feel European are 
misrepresented and indifferent. The two categories may attribute similar importance to EU 
integration but opt for a different stance on this issue. Whilst EU salience impacts on YRWHUV¶
attained level of representation, the systemic EU salience - that is, the importance that parties 
attribute to EU integration - does not impact on the attained level of voter representation.  
 
This analysis points to the fact that a large number of voters for pro and anti-integration 
parties are in favour of maintaining the status-quo and do not want further integration. Even if 
they follow the news regularly, they still consent to be represented by an anti-integration 
party. When status-quo voters choose an anti-integration party (Table 3, model 2, indifferent), 
their decision is not based on whether EU issues are salient or not. Therefore EU salience 
cannot explain why voters fall in the indifferent category in this situation.    
 
The perceived (non)economic costs of integration and their influence on representation is, as 
expected, negative. The higher the perceived threat by other cultures through immigration, 
the lower the level of representation attained. One third of Europeans believe that EU has had 
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a negative influence on the level of immigration to their own country. Out of those citizens, a 
majority of 60 percent reside in old member states, where immigration levels are much higher 
than in new member states. The cultural threat is widespread across all EU countries: 74 
percent of the European electorate support the idea that immigrants should adapt to the host 
culture and one third of the electorate also think that immigration has become worse and 
increased over the past decades (EES 2009). However, those who believe that immigration 
should decrease in their country are 15 percent more likely to be misrepresented and 4 
percent more likely to fall in the indifferent representation category (odds ratio 1.15 and 1.04, 
Table 1) than to be represented. The reason behind their choice rests on the knowledge held 
about the EU in general (odds ratio 1.14), which could ultimately influence them to choose a 
pro-integration party rather than the opposite. The vote choice for a pro-integration party is 
further analysed in the next section.  
 
What differentiates representation by pro- and anti-integration parties? 
 
The analysis of costs and benefits is better reflected when the analysis of representation is 
conducted separately on samples with voters for pro-integration parties and the same is 
repeated for voters of anti-integration parties (see Table 3).   
 
[Table 3. Representation by pro and anti-integration parties about here] 
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The analysis reported in Table 3 is the result of two separate multinomial logit models for 
representation by pro- and anti-integration parties. The number of voters and countries for 
both models are reduced as anti-integration parties operate only in 16 EU countries5 in 2009.  
 
At the individual level, the results demonstrate the robustness of previous findings reported in 
Table 1. With this analysis, we are better able to explain representation in both directions.  
EU satisfaction works in the expected direction and has a stronger effect in the group of 
voters for pro-integration parties. The more satisfied with the EU, the higher the probability 
to vote and be represented by a pro-integration party and also the lower the likelihood to 
favour the status-quo and vote for a party promoting integration (model 1, Table 3). 
Additionally, the higher the perceived costs of integration - both in terms of immigration and 
political implications for member states- the greater the probability of being represented by a 
party opposing integration (model 2, Table 3). Perceived costs in the form of threat from 
immigration and EU decisions taken against the interest of member states are the strongest 
explanations for why voters chose representation by a Eurosceptic party. In 2009, a majority 
of EU citizens expressed no confidence that EU decisions are in the interest of their own 
country.  
 
When the perceived costs of integration are high, the probability of being represented by a 
party opposing integration increases. The results in Table 3, model 2, point towards perceived 
costs having the effect of reducing the probability of falling into the indifferent category by 
an average of 15 percent. The reverse situation however has a higher probability. Indifferent 
voters who prefer the status-quo may also end up voting for pro-integration parties (Table 3, 
model 1). Perceived high costs makes them choose a party promoting further integration, 
                                                 
5 Italy and Austria were excluded from these models as the sample did not include voters represented by anti-
integration parties in these two countries.  
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most probably because in this case, they have some knowledge about the functioning of the 
EU (odds ratio 1.18), which does not make a significant difference when they chose a 
Eurosceptic party. Additionally, the results show that, alongside having some knowledge 
about the EU, status-quo voters who watch election related news on TV are more likely to 
vote for a pro-integration party (model 1, Table 3). Overall, voters in the indifferent category 
are highly educated but do not have a clear interest in politics or a clear left or right political 
orientation (Table 1). They can nevertheless be mobilized by the visual media (Table 3 model 
1) and subsequently influenced to choose a pro-integration party.  
 
Citizens who prefer the status-quo and vote for an anti-integration party follow news 
regularly from various other sources (model 2, Table 3). This draws attention to the 
importance of the media tone and content. TV news seem to drive the pro-EU representation 
while diverse news content fuels status-quo votes for the Eurosceptic parties.  
 
Misrepresentation by parties against EU integration increases significantly in party systems 
where competition is carried out on more than three dimensions. This is clearly an indication 
that other dimensions such as taxes, welfare, morality policies or environment carry heavier 
weight in the eyes of the voters. In those situations, voters may choose to get informed and be 
represented on other dimensions which they deem to be more important.  
 
Another significant detail which transpires when the analysis is repeated this way is that 
voters in the new EU12 are significantly less likely to be misrepresented or indifferent when 
they vote for a party for integration. Perceived benefits are an important explanation for high 
quality representation when voters choose a pro-EU party. Against initial expectations, actual 
benefits from the EU budget do not impact on the quality of representation by pro-integration 
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parties. These benefits, however, seem to be de facto very high in systems where voters are 
4.4 times more likely to be misrepresented and 4.6 time more likely to allow an indifferent 
representation by anti-EU parties (Table 3, model 2).   
 
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
This article applied a novel approach to the concept of representation and has matched actual 
party positions with their voters¶ positions on EU integration. The quality of substantive 
representation was measured by the degree to which the view of the voters and the parties 
they vote for in European Parliament elections align. Hence the paper proposes three 
categories of representation: represented, misrepresented and indifferent. The results show 
that the gap between elite and voters is indeed widening, especially if more and more voters 
prefer the status-quo with regards to European integration.  
 
By applying a cost/benefit argument to the quality of representation on European integration 
across the EU27, the analysis shows that the quality of representation is driven by 
perceptions of benefits, rather than by real benefits. Perceived benefits have a strong and 
SRVLWLYHLPSDFWRQWKHOLNHOLKRRGRIDPDWFKEHWZHHQWKHYRWHUDQGKLVSDUW\¶VSUHIHUHQFHVRQ
EU integration. Conversely, high perceived costs of integration drive representation by pro-
integration parties to very low levels, especially when immigration is considered a threat by 
the voters. The actual benefits received from the EU budget by each country were 
hypothesized to positively influence the match between the voter and party preferences on 
EU integration. At odds with initial expectations, in countries where EU spends the most per 
capita, we do not necessarily find better representation. In fact, where EU spending per capita 
is high, voters are either misrepresented or indifferent and highly likely to vote for an anti-
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integration party. More data collection and further research is however needed in order to 
ascertain voters¶ awareness and information about actual financial benefits from the EU.  
 
Overall the analysis finds that represented voters on EU integration do not take into account 
DFWXDO(8VSHQGLQJLQWKHLUFRXQWU\EXWKDYHDYHU\SRVLWLYHRSLQLRQDERXWWKH(8¶VDFWLYLW\
in general and find a sense of efficacy in casting a vote for a party with matching attitudes 
towards integration. This type of voter can be found especially across new member states. 
The indifferent voters, who prefer the status-quo and yet vote for a pro or anti-integration 
party, can be mainly found in old member states and are less satisfied with the way EU works 
in practice. High perceived costs associated with integration make voters much more 
disposed to vote for a party opposing integration than to be indifferent. In other words, 
representation by Eurosceptic parties increases when the perceived costs are high. The 
misrepresented voters can be satisfied with the EU but are mainly voting for an anti-
integration party, especially in countries where party competition takes place along a larger 
number of dimensions, some of which could be more important that the issue of European 
integration.  
 
Overall, the impact of costs and benefits from integration is highly relevant for all three 
categories of representation. As for the mediation factor - EU salience- as expected, 
representation by parties promoting integration increases when EU is salient for voters and 
especially when voters think of themselves as Europeans. Whether the EU is salient or not for 
parties does not make any difference to the quality of representation. Representation can be 
attained even when the EU is not the most important issue addressed by parties in their 
programmes and campaigns. Similarly, misrepresentation can occur when the EU is salient 
for parties. Specifically, even when EU integration is a highly debated topic across a party 
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system, it is the importance of other issues, cumulated with a high number of dimensions of 
competition, which may influence a pro-integration voter to choose an anti-integration party.  
Furthermore, the salience of EU integration FDQQRWH[SODLQYRWHUV¶FKRLFHIRUWKHLQGLIIHUHQW
category of representation, especially when status-quo voters choose a Eurosceptic party. An 
investigation into how the three categories of representation apply to other issue dimensions 
constitutes an avenue for further research.  
 
This analysis has shown that perceived benefits do drive the perfect voter-party match on EU 
integration while perceived costs, when high, drive the perfect match between Eurosceptic 
voters and likeminded parties and make voters less indifferent. The relevance of this analysis 
extends to the 2014 European Parliament elections firstly because the voters can be divided in 
the same three categories with regards to their opinion about European integration. By 2014, 
the number of pro-integration voters decreased by 8 percent, the anti-integration group gained 
a similar percentage and the number of status-quo voters remained about the same (EES 
2014, www.gesis.org). Secondly, the values of variables found relevant for representation by 
this analysis corresponds to similar levels amongst voters in 2014. Additionally, the 
percentage of anti-integration elite has increased as demonstrated by the larger number of 
Eurosceptic MEPs elected. These developments, cumulated with the findings from this 
analysis, push representation on European integration into the direction of being increasingly 
driven by perceived costs rather than benefits.  
 
These results have implications for the future of EU integration and representation. The 
analysis points to the large number of indifferent (status-quo voters) who, in the absence of a 
party with similar views, in future European Parliament elections could be driven to vote for 
Eurosceptic parties as a result of the perceived costs of integration. For example, recent 
29 
 
waves of immigration following the conflict in Syria could increase the perception of costs 
from integration and further escalate the levels of representation by Eurosceptic parties. In 
order to avoid this situation in future European Parliament elections, voters could be better 
mobilized by increasing the level of information about the EU and the level of awareness 
about concrete rather than perceived benefits from EU integration.  
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TABLES AND FIGURES  
 
 
Figure 1. Quality of representation across European countries 
 
Source: For parties: EU Profiler data base (www.profiler.eu) of national programme commitments, 2009. For 
citizens, the data is based on the European Election Survey, 2009 (www.piredeu.eu). 
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Table 1. Explaining imperfect representation through costs and benefits 
 misrepresented   indifferent   
 
BENEFITS 
    
positive evaluation 0.666***   (0.022) 0.806***  (0.030) 
EU policy influence 0.945***  (0.016) 0.947**  (0.017) 
 
COSTS 
    
immigrants should adapt 1.059***  (0.017) 0.979  (0.018) 
immigration should decrease 1.154*** (0.023) 1.042* (0.022) 
EU decisions not in interest of own ctry 1.637*** (0.078) 1.343*** (0.070) 
EP does not consider citizen's concerns 0.996 (0.023) 0.908*** (0.023) 
 
CONTEXT 
    
New EU12 0.849** (0.042) 0.783*** (0.043) 
competition on EU integration (0/1) 0.991 (0.053) 1.066 (0.062) 
EU spending (log) 2.610*** (0.310) 1.374* (0.178) 
N dimensions party competition 1.013 (0.025) 1.037 (0.029) 
 
SALIENCE 
    
EU should deal with imp issues 1.065 (0.047) 1.057 (0.051) 
cares which party wins EP elections 0.997 (0.021) 1.010 (0.024) 
feels European 0.769*** (0.037) 0.808*** (0.043) 
 
CONTROLS 
    
education 1.022 (0.025) 1.055* (0.029) 
standard of living 0.916** (0.027) 0.925* (0.030) 
knowledge about EU 1.141** (0.051) 1.034 (0.050) 
neither left nor right 1.120* (0.056) 1.352*** (0.072) 
evaluation of gov't econ perform 1.031 (0.024) 0.998 (0.025) 
watch election news on TV 0.973 (0.031) 0.959 (0.033) 
how many days follows news 0.974 (0.013) 0.993 (0.015) 
     
Pseudo R-Square 0.041    
chi2 1081.078    
p 0.000    
N 12,496    
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001     
Sources: Voters: European Election Study 2009, www.piredeu.eu; Parties: www.profiler.eu; 
Multinomial model. The coefficients show odds ratios. Represented=reference category;  
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7DEOH1HWEHQHILFLDULHVDQGQHWFRQWULEXWRUVWRWKH(8EXGJHW¼ 
Source: European Commission 2009;  
http://ec.europa.eu/budget/library/biblio/publications/2010/fin_report/fin_report_10_data_en.
pdf ; http://ec.europa.eu/budget/library/biblio/documents/2007/disch_status_funds 
Note: *Balance per capita includes funds initially allocated by the European Commission 
prior to the suspension of funds. The net balaQFHSHUFDSLWDDIWHUVXVSHQVLRQVZDV¼SHU
FDSLWDIRU5RPDQLDDQG¼SHUFDSLWDIRU%XOJDULD 
 
 Contributed (mn) Received (mn) Balance/capita 
Luxembourg 287 1454 2362 
Lithuania 322 1790 438 
Estonia 159 716 416 
Greece 2425 5434 267 
Hungary 909 3569 265 
Latvia 216 710 218 
Portugal 1637 3724 196 
Poland 3134 9253 160 
Bulgaria 390 1531 150* 
Czech Rep 1374 2948 150 
Romania 1342 3349 93* 
Slovenia 428 616 93 
Belgium 4661 5629 90 
Slovakia 712 1192 89 
Malta 64 72 19 
Spain 11170 11614 10 
Cyprus 199 172 -34 
Ireland 1534 1378 -35 
Sweden 1855 1452 -44 
Austria 2316 1817 -56 
United Kingdom 10112 6247 -63 
Netherlands 3337 1850 -90 
France 20093 13632 -100 
Italy 15418 9372 -101 
Germany 20510 11713 -107 
Finland 1814 1208 -114 
Denmark 2491 1328 -211 
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Table 3. Explaining the choice of representation by pro- and anti-integration parties.  
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; N countries =14; Source:  same as table 1. Models 1 and 2: Multinomial models with represented=reference category; 
  
 Model 1: Voters for pro-integration parties  Model 2: Voters for anti-integration parties 
 misrepresented  indifferent  misrepresented  indifferent  
BENEFITS Odds ratios se Odds ratios se Odds ratios se Odds ratios se 
positive evaluation 0.547*** (.029) 0.731*** (.042) 2.296*** (.233) 1.693*** (.182) 
EU policy influence 0.946* (.026) 0.958 (.026) 1.068 (.058) 0.912 (.057) 
COSTS         
immigrants should adapt 1.092*** (.029) 1.018 (.028) 0.981 (.051) 0.886* (.049) 
immigration should decrease 1.291*** (.041) 1.078* (.034) 0.751*** (.046) 0.834** (.054) 
(8GHFLVLRQVQRWLQLQWHUHVWRIF¶WU\ 1.890*** (.143) 1.430*** (.112) 0.518*** (.082) 0.778 (.135) 
(3GRHVQ¶WFRQVLGHUFLWL]HQV¶FRQFHUQV 1.035 (.038) 0.909* (.035) 0.920 (.062) 0.824** (.058) 
CONTEXT         
New EU12 0.598*** (.052) 0.539*** (.050) 1.617** (.272) 1.040 (.187) 
EU spending (log) 1.402 (.351) 1.113 (.280) 4.445*** (1.877) 4.642*** (2.007) 
N dimensions party competition 0.982 (.059) 1.018 (.064) 1.341** (.133) 1.221 (.134) 
SALIENCE         
EU deals with imp issues 1.243** (.089) 1.137 (.082) 0.814 (.116) 0.841 (.128) 
cares which party wins EP el 0.992 (.034) 1.038 (.037) 1.126 (.072) 1.011 (.066) 
feels European 0.654*** (.050) 0.674*** (.054) 1.102 (.161) 1.004 (.156) 
CONTROLS         
education 1.037 (.041) 1.079 (.044) 1.114 (.090) 1.080 (.090) 
standard of living 0.979 (.048) 0.963 (.048) 1.078 (.101) 1.121 (.111) 
knowledge about EU 1.261** (.091) 1.188* (.087) 0.924 (.131) 0.866 (.130) 
neither left nor right 1.184* (.098) 1.398*** (.116) 0.970 (.186) 1.298 (.247) 
evaluation of gov't econ perform 1.065 (.040) 1.010 (.038) 0.929 (.067) 0.988 (.076) 
watch election news on TV 0.816*** (.043) 0.830*** (.044) 1.061 (.109) 0.957 (.102) 
how many days follows news 1.019 (.024) 1.004 (.024) 0.931 (.042) 1.167** (.066) 
Pseudo R-Square 0.079    0.131    
chi2 895.986    410.463    
p 0.000    0.000    
N voters    5,471    1,468    
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Table 1. Imperfect representation on European integration: recoded distribution per country (%) 
 
N=12, 496 voters; Sources: Voters: European Election Study 2009; www.piredeu.eu q80; 
Parties: www.profiler.eu; CSPP470 EU integration dimension.  
 
Misrepresented 
Party anti, voter pro 
Party pro, voter anti 
Indifferent 
Party anti, voter neutral 
Party pro, voter neutral 
Represented 
Party pro voter pro 
Party anti voter anti 
Romania  17 12 72 
Poland  9 22 69 
Spain  14 19 67 
Netherlands  21 17 62 
Lithuania  26 17 57 
Malta  25 20 56 
Greece  32 15 53 
UK  24 24 52 
Slovenia  28 21 51 
Bulgaria  25 24 51 
Slovakia  29 21 50 
Italy  32 18 50 
Hungary  32 18 50 
Sweden  23 28 49 
EU mean 30 21 49 
Cyprus  33 19 48 
Luxembourg  36 17 46 
Germany  31 22 46 
France  37 18 46 
Ireland  23 32 46 
Denmark  30 26 44 
Austria  30 27 43 
Belgium  37 21 43 
Portugal  30 29 41 
Czech Rep 40 19 40 
Estonia  44 20 37 
Finland  42 28 30 
Latvia  57 19 24 
Total N 3,749 2,698 6,049 
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 Table 2. List of variables in the analysis 
 
Source: individual: www.piredeu.eu; N voters=12,496; N countries=27; EU satisfaction 
scale: Number of positive responses for EU trusted, a good thing. EU policy impact scale: 
Mean score on EU positive influence for economic conditions, health care, interest rates in 
UHVSRQGHQW¶VFRXQWU\(8FRPSHWLWLRQRQ(8LQWHJUDWLRQ'LPHQVLRQVRISDUW\FRPSHWLWLRQ
EU profiler and Borz and Rose (2010) SPP470; EU spending: European Commission; 
 
 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
     
Representation (Table 1) 1.18 0.87 0 2 
 
BENEFITS 
    
positive evaluation 1.26 0.77 0 2 
EU policy influence 1.29 1.39 0 5 
 
COSTS 
    
immigrants should adapt 3.11 1.42 1 5 
immigration should decrease 3.43 1.27 1 5 
(8GHFLVLRQVQRWLQLQWHUHVWRIF¶WU\ 0.46 0.50 0 1 
(3GRHVQ¶WFRQVLGHUFLWL]HQV¶FRQFHUQV 2.63 1.04 1 5 
 
CONTEXT 
    
NEWEU12 0.36 0.48 0 1 
competition on EU integration (0/1) 0.63 0.48 0 1 
EU spending (log) 2.39 0.21 2 2.74 
N dimensions party competition 3.89 1.09 1 5 
 
SALIENCE 
    
EU deals with imp issues 0.57 0.49 0 1 
cares which party wins EP elections 3.89 1.03 1 5 
feels European 0.65 0.48 0 1 
 
CONTROLS 
    
education 3.14 0.93 1 4 
standard of living 2.17 0.77 1 3 
knowledge about EU 0.39 0.49 0 1 
neither left nor right 0.26 0.44 0 1 
evaluation of gov't econ perform 3.11 0.95 1 4 
watch election news on TV 2.11 0.71 1 3 
how many days follows news 6.21 1.61 0 7 
